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This volume contains papers presented at a National Bureau of  Economic 
Research Conference on the Economics of  Aging, in Carefree, Arizona, in 
May 1988. The conference was the second in a series of conferences associated 
with  the  NBER’s  ongoing Project on  the  Economics of  Aging.  The  first 
conference was held in New Orleans in March 1987. The papers presented at 
that conference are contained in a volume entitled The Economics of  Aging 
(Wise 1989). The goal of  the Economics of Aging Project is to further our 
understanding of the consequences for older people and for the population at 
large of an aging population. The papers in this volume are divided into two 
broad categories: (1) housing and living arrangements and (2) labor market 
behavior and retirement. 
Housing and Living Arrangements 
The majority of the wealth of  most older people is in the form of housing 
equity. This housing wealth is a potential source of support during retirement. 
It is claimed that many older people would choose to decrease their housing 
wealth to finance current consumption expenditures, were it not for the large 
transaction costs associated with moving. Indeed, the rationale for a market in 
reverse annuity mortgages has been that older people would like to withdraw 
wealth from housing without moving and without incurring the large trans- 
action costs of  moving. “But They Don’t Want to Reduce Housing Equity,” 
Steven Venti and David Wise conclude. Venti and Wise address two related 
questions: (1) Would the typical elderly family like to withdraw wealth from 
housing? (2) Do the transaction costs of moving constrain adjustments in the 
housing wealth of older people as they age? 
In answer to the first question, the authors conclude that, were all elderly 
homeowners to choose their most preferred levels of housing wealth, given 
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their existing financial and other circumstances,  there would be little change 
in housing wealth on average. Although some elderly would make substantial 
changes in  housing equity  were they  to choose  new  housing, some would 
choose to add to housing wealth and others to reduce it. On balance, were all 
elderly to move and choose optimal levels of housing equity, the amount of 
housing  equity  would  be  increased  slightly.  Thus, the results reinforce  the 
earlier findings of Venti and Wise, and those of Feinstein and McFadden, both 
studies  found  in  The Economics of  Aging. Most  elderly  are  not  liquidity 
constrained. And, contrary to standard formulations of the life-cycle hypoth- 
esis, the typical elderly family has no desire to reduce housing equity. This is 
true even among families with low total wealth, for whom housing equity is 
a large fraction of  total  wealth.  The desired reduction of housing  equity is 
largest among families with low income and high housing wealth. Even in this 
case, however, the desired reductions are rather small and are more than offset 
by the desired increases of other families, especially those with high income 
and low housing wealth. 
In answer to the second question, the authors conclude that the transaction 
costs of  moving, including the psychic costs of changing neighborhoods and 
losing contact with old friends and the like, are very large. Because of these 
large  transaction  costs,  the  gain  in  utility  from reallocating  wealth  from 
housing equity to more liquid financial assets has to be large in order to justify 
moving. The gain from moving, however, is very small for most older people. 
These results help explain the low rates of housing mobility. Based on the data 
in  the  Retirement History  Survey, approximately  8 percent  of homeowners 
move during a two-year period. Mobility rates increase to about 15 percent at 
the time of precipitating shocks like a change in marital status or retirement. 
The reluctance of most older people to move is reflected in the large transaction 
costs associated with moving. 
The evidence of high moving transaction costs suggests that some families 
may be prevented from moving, even though they would like to reduce their 
housing equity. It is for these families that reverse annuity mortgages would 
apparently  be  most  beneficial.  Limited  demand, though,  may  explain  the 
absence of an active market for such financial instruments-most  older people 
do not want to reduce their housing equity. Even families who overcome the 
moving transaction costs to move from one house to another are as likely to 
increase as to decrease the money that they tie up in housing. Moreover, the 
potential  gain  from  reallocating  wealth  (either  increasing  or  decreasing 
housing equity) is very small for most older people. 
The paper  by  Chunrong  Ai, Jonathan  Feinstein,  Daniel  McFadden,  and 
Henry Pollakowski, “The Dynamics of Housing Demand by the Elderly: User 
Cost Effects,” is the second in a series of papers on the economic environment 
in which older people must make housing decisions, on the housing choices 
that they make, and on the consequences of these choices. The paper in this 3  Overview 
volume  concentrates  on the  construction  of  a  comprehensive  measure  of 
housing price and on the user costs of housing for older people. 
The user cost of housing  described in the paper includes several compo- 
nents.  Because  of  the  high  transaction  costs  of  moving  (once  a  housing 
decision is made), the authors argue that housing choices should be based on 
an inclusive measure of housing cost that includes both the current costs and 
the  expected  future  costs  of  any  given  housing  choice.  Thus,  the  first 
component of the authors’ user cost is the expected present value of the future 
stream of  out-of-pocket  costs that  will  be  incurred  as  long  as the  current 
dwelling is occupied. For renters, the out-of-pocket costs include only rent and 
utilities.  For homeowners,  out-of-pocket costs include mortgage  payments, 
real estate taxes, utilities,  maintenance,  and insurance.  The deductibility of 
home  mortgage  interest  offsets  a  part  of  these  direct  costs.  The  second 
component  of  user  cost  is  the  transaction  costs  associated  with  moves, 
purchases,  or  sales.  The  third  component  of  user  cost  applies  only  to 
homeowners and reflects the capital gains on the housing asset. The typically 
increasing market value of a home (the capital gain) offsets the direct cost of 
home ownership and thus lowers the net user cost of  housing. 
The approach taken  in  the  paper  is to calculate  an  annualized  expected 
present value of user cost, taking account of all these factors, in a fashion that 
mimics the calculations of  a representative household.  A particularly novel 
component of the authors’ calculations is a “Ricardian equivalence”  assump- 
tion.  To  incorporate  the  value  of  bequests,  it  is  assumed  that  a  unit  of 
consumption by descendants in the future has the same marginal utility for the 
nonsurviving household (who leaves the bequest) as it does for the surviving 
descendants (who receive the bequest). 
The primary conclusion of this paper is that carefully constructed user costs 
for housing,  which  adjust  for income  tax  offsets  and  capital  gains, show 
declining  annualized housing costs after age 60. While the income of older 
people declines even more rapidly, so that the housing share of consumption 
expenditures rises with age, this increase is not dramatic. The ratio of housing 
costs to income appears to level off for the very elderly. The authors also find 
that the user costs of housing increase sharply with dwelling size. The user cost 
of owner housing generally exceeds that of rental housing for middle-aged and 
elderly households. The persistence of ownership in the face of this differential 
suggests the presence of substantial quality differences in owned and rental 
housing, the authors conclude. They find little evidence in the relatively small 
Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics  (PSID)  data  set  that,  at  the  margin, 
households are modifying choices to avoid relatively high-priced housing. The 
findings of Ai et al. are consistent with the finding of Venti and Wise that the 
typical elderly family does not want to reduce housing consumption as it ages. 
Axel Borsch-Supan presents “A  Dynamic Analysis of  Household Dissolu- 
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from the PSID. The stability of  living arrangements over time is the  most 
striking finding. Transitions  to an institution or to the home of  children  are 
atypical. Even after the death of  a spouse or the onset of disability or during 
the  last  five  years  before  death,  few  older  people  change  their  living 
arrangements. While living  arrangement  transitions  are  infrequent  overall, 
they are most common after the loss of  a spouse. Almost all transitions take 
place in the same year as the spouse’s death. Borsch-Supan also finds that older 
men are more likely to live in institutions or shared living arrangements and 
that nonwhite elderly  are more likely than white elderly to live with family 
members or in other shared living arrangements. 
Although living in an institution is inferior to other living arrangements from 
the point of view of most older people, the likelihood of institutionalization 
rose  substantially  between  1968 and  1984.  During  the  same period,  the 
likelihood of being  “taken in”  by relatives or friends fell dramatically. The 
author concludes, “this disturbing tendency toward isolation of the elderly- 
particularly  pronounced  among  the  very  old,  who  are  also  the  most 
vulnerable-is  the most important message of this paper.”  The author suggests 
that the growing isolation of older people will affect the cost of health care and 
social support programs, which are largely assumed by a declining younger 
population. According to Borsch-Supan, if public policy stands any chance of 
improving  the  well-being  of  the  elderly,  the  appropriate  time  for  policy 
intervention is after the death of a spouse, when living arrangement transitions 
are most common. 
In  “The  American  Way  of  Aging:  An  Event  History  Analysis,”  David 
Ellwood and Thomas Kane also present a dynamic analysis of transitions in 
marital status, health and functional ability, living arrangements, and income. 
Like the Borsch-Supan  analysis, their analysis is based on data in the PSID. 
The methodologies used in the two papers are different, however. 
According  to  Ellwood  and  Kane,  even  though  only  4  percent  of  the 
population aged 75-79  and 12  percent of the population aged 80 and over lived 
in  institutions  in  1980,  a  much  larger  percentage  of  older  people  enter 
institutions at some time during their lives. Their simulation analysis indicates 
that  12 percent of  men and 38 percent of women will enter an institution at 
some time after age 65. Income was shown to be an important factor in both 
institutionalization and mortality. People with low incomes at age 65 lived four 
years fewer, on average, than people with high incomes and were much more 
likely to develop functional disabilities.  People with low incomes were also 
much more likely to be in nursing homes or to be dependent on others in a 
shared living arrangement by age 80. 
Comparing the  previous  characteristics  of  men  who  eventually  entered 
institutions  with  the  previous  characteristics  of  men  who  did  not  enter 
institutions,  the authors find no significant difference in previous  functional 
ability but a substantial  difference  in previous  income level. The men who 5  Overview 
eventually  entered  institutions  were  disproportionately  from  low-income 
backgrounds. By contrast, women who eventually  entered  institutions were 
virtually indistinguishable from women who did not. The authors argue that 
these findings result from differential mortality. Disabled men are more likely 
to enter institutions, but disabled men also die more quickly, which decreases 
the likelihood of entering an institution.  Similarly, lower-income women are 
more likely to enter an institution, but they also die more quickly, which again 
decreases the likelihood of entering an institution. 
Ellwood and Kane find that men and women entering institutions come from 
different prior living arrangements.  Over one-third of the men who entered 
institutions  were  previously  dependent on others in  shared  living  arrange- 
ments.  Only 18 percent of women entering institutions came from a shared 
living arrangement.  Women who entered nursing homes were more likely to 
have been living independently and more likely to have been widows for some 
period of time. In addition, the authors find that unmarried women who were 
poor at age 80 were often relatively poor at age 65 as well. Over half of poor 
unmarried women at age 80 were not married at age 65. Widowhood led to 
a 20 percent drop in the standard of living of women, but widowers experi- 
enced only a 10 percent drop in their standard of living. 
Perhaps no single statistic raises more concern about postwar changes in the 
U.S.  family than the proportion of older people living alone. Since 1940, the 
proportion  of  unmarried  noninstitutionalized  older people living  alone has 
risen from less than 25 percent to over 60 percent. For people over age 85, the 
proportion  has increased  from  13 percent  to 57 percent. The proportion of 
those over 85 living in institutions has also increased dramatically. Since 1940, 
those proportion of people over age 85 living in institutions has increased from 
7 percent to almost 25 percent.  Part of  the reason that older people are less 
likely to live with their children  is simply that they have fewer children.  In 
1940, for each person age 80 and over, there were four people between ages 
60 and 65; in  1985, for each person age 80 and over, there were fewer than 
two people between ages 60 and 65;  and, when the baby boom population is 
in its 80s, there will be only one person between ages 60 and 65 for each baby 
boomer. 
While age demographics appear to explain some of the living arrangement 
changes occurring  over time, many believe  that the rising  income of  older 
people is also an important factor. Laurence Kotlikoff and John Morris point 
out, however, that the analyses underlying this view have not considered the 
incomes and preferences of the children of older people. In “Why Don’t the 
Elderly Live with their Children? A New Look,” Kotlikoff and Morris present 
a model of the joint living arrangement choice of parents and children. They 
then use a new data set to analyze how the preferences and income levels of 
older people and their children influence living arrangement decisions. Their 
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important  factors in explaining  why  so many  older people  live alone.  The 
analysis is based on new data collected through  the  1986 Hebrew Rehabili- 
tation Center for the Aged (HRCA) Elderly Survey and the 1986 HRC-NBER 
Child Survey. 
The estimates reported by  Kotlikoff  and Moms suggest that many of  the 
characteristics of  adult children,  such as income and  marital  status, are as 
important as parent characteristics in explaining living arrangement decisions. 
Their  findings  also  indicate  substantial  differences  in  living  arrangement 
preferences between elderly parents and their adult children. Almost half the 
parents appear to prefer shared living arrangements with their children. Only 
a quarter of the adult children appear to prefer shared living arrangements with 
their parents. This analysis suggests that a large number of elderly parents live 
alone, even though they would prefer to live with their children. The authors 
conclude that the intrinsic preferences of  parent  and child for shared  living 
rather than the relative or absolute incomes of the two are most important in 
determining the probability of shared living. They also conclude that income 
differences  are not  as important  as  may  previously  have  been  thought  in 
explaining living arrangements. 
Alan  Garber  and  Thomas MaCurdy  concentrate  on the  determinants  of 
‘‘Predicting Nursing Home Utilization  among the High-Risk Elderly.”  Their 
analysis  is  motivated  by  the  needs  of  private  insurers  (particularly  those 
developing  and  marketing  private  long-term  care insurance  products)  and 
others for adequate information about expected future nursing home utiliza- 
tion.  They  consider  the  probability  of  nursing  home  admission,  expected 
number of annual nursing home days, the distribution of lengths of stay in 
nursing homes, and how the aspects of  utilization vary with other personal 
characteristics. They also explore some of the possible effects of moral hazard 
and adverse selection on future utilization. The analysis is based on data from 
the National Long Term Care Demonstration (Channeling), which has a sample 
population  determined to have a high risk of nursing home utilization. 
Garber and MaCurdy find that the factors that influence nursing home ad- 
missions are largely distinct from those that are generally expected to influence 
health and mortality. For example, functional limitations have very little effect 
on mortality but a very large effect on nursing home entry. Similarly, the factors 
that are associated with increased duration of nursing home stay are not nec- 
essarily the factors that indicate a strong risk of admission. The probability of 
nursing home entry is higher for nonhomeowners, people without living chil- 
dren, whites, Medicaid participants, older people, and functionally or mentally 
impaired people. Income does not appear to have a major independent asso- 
ciation with nursing home entry. The probability  of leaving a nursing home 
(shortening the duration of stay) is higher for married people and people with 
living children, confirming the important role of families in providing informal 
long-term care services. Homeownership and Medicaid coverage do not seem 
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The authors point out that numerous previous studies have documented the 
association between  socioeconomic factors and health status. The most im- 
portant  socioeconomic  factors  have been education and, to a lesser extent, 
income, wealth, occupation, and race. The authors  found no evidence that these 
factors  are closely  tied  to nursing  home  utilization,  with  two exceptions. 
Advanced education was associated with longer nursing home stays, and non- 
white race was associated with a lower probability of nursing home admission. 
There were some differences in nursing home utilization between men and 
women. At any age, a woman is more likely to enter a nursing home than a 
comparable man. If she enters a nursing home, she will also tend to stay longer 
than  her  male  counterpart.  The authors  emphasize,  however,  that  elderly 
women  are  not  comparable to elderly  men.  Women  are more  likely  to be 
unmarried (because they usually live longer than their spouses) and to have 
functional  impairment, so their  nursing  home  utilization  tends  to  be  even 
higher, relative to men, than the authors’ results suggest. 
To show the effect of Medicaid coverage on nursing home utilization,  the 
authors  simulate the distribution  of  nursing  home  use for a very high  risk 
individual-a  severely impaired, unmarried  65-year-old  male who does not 
own his  home.  Without  Medicaid  coverage, this  person  has  a 54 percent 
probability of entering a nursing home by age 70 and will stay in the nursing 
home for an average of  thirty-three  weeks. An identically described person 
with Medicaid coverage has more than a 70 percent probability of entering a 
nursing  home and  will  stay  for an average  of  forty-six  weeks.  The same 
influence of Medicaid can be seen for women and for less-impaired persons 
with better social and economic supports. The authors find that, in every age 
category, both the likelihood of admission and the duration of stay in a nursing 
home are longer for men who have Medicaid coverage. 
According  to  Garber  and  MaCurdy,  forecasting  future  nursing  home 
utilization involves distinguishing between the factors influencing survival and 
the factors influencing nursing  home use.  Disabled and sickly older people 
may not be the heaviest utilizers of  nursing homes because they die early. In 
forecasting future nursing home utilization, life-prolonging technology might 
increase survival but have no effect on age-adjusted disability from chronic 
illness. As a result, life-prolonging technology could increase nursing home 
utilization dramatically.  The different  influence of  dementia and functional 
impairment  on survival  and nursing  home use is another example. Neither 
dementia  nor  functional  impairment  increase  mortality  (at  least  in  this 
population),  but both increase the likelihood of nursing home admission and 
the  duration  of  stay  in  a  nursing  home.  Both  dementia  and  functional 
impairment  are likely  to be more common in the future as long as old-age 
survival  continues to  improve.  Because  there  are  no effective preventive 
measures or treatments for the most common causes of  dementia or for most 
functional  impairments,  life-prolonging  health  interventions  are  likely  to 
increase the demand for nursing home care. 8  David A. Wise 
Labor Market Behavior and Retirement 
The labor force participation  rates of older workers have declined dramat- 
ically in recent years. In 1971, for example, 74.1 percent of  men aged 60-64 
were in the labor force; in 1986, only 54.9 percent were in the labor force. A 
great deal of analysis has emphasized the role of  Social Security provisions in 
encouraging  earlier  retirement.  Particular  attention has been  directed to the 
large increases in Social Security benefits in the early 1970s. Largely ignored 
have been firm pension plans, which were introduced rapidly beginning in the 
late 1940s and 1950s and now cover about 50 percent of employees. About 75 
percent  of  covered  employees have  defined benefit  plans, under  which  the 
employer promises  to pay  the  worker  a  specified  retirement  income. The 
amount of retirement income is typically determined by the final salary of the 
worker and the number of years of firm employment. 
Previous work has demonstrated that defined benefit pension plans typically 
have substantial incentives for early retirement. The typical firm plan provides 
a very large reward for remaining with the firm until some age, often the early 
retirement age, and then a substantial inducement to leave the firm, often as 
early as age 55. Almost all plans incorporate a large penalty for working past 
age 65. The gain in wage earnings for working an additional year is often offset 
in large part by a loss in the present value of  future pension benefits. 
In “The Pension Inducement to Retire: An Option Value Analysis,”  James 
Stock  and  David  Wise  attempt  to  quantify  the  effects  of  pension  plan 
provisions on departure rates from the firm and, in particular, to demonstrate 
the effect of potential changes in plan provisions. The analysis is based on the 
personnel records of a large Fortune 500 firm and applies the “option value” 
model described  in the authors’ earlier work. Comparing actual retirement 
rates with those predicted by the model, Stock and Wise have found that the 
model predicts very complicated retirement patterns with considerable preci- 
sion. 
A particularly important component of the analysis is to compare the effects 
of  changes in Social Security provisions  with  changes in firm pension plan 
provisions. They find that the provisions of the firm’s pension plan have a much 
greater effect than Social Security regulations on the retirement decisions of 
the firm’s employees. Increasing the firm’s early retirement age from 55 to 60, 
for example, would reduce by almost 40 percent, from .48 to .30, the fraction 
of employees that choose to retire by age 60. The effect of changes in Social 
Security rules, on the other hand, would be comparatively  small. By raising 
the Social Security retirement ages by one year,  for example, the proportion 
of  workers retired by age 62 would decrease by only about 4 percent. 
Stock  and Wise  suggest  that  changes in  Social Security  provisions  that 
would otherwise encourage workers to continue working can easily be offset 
by countervailing changes in the provisions of the firm’s pension plan. Firm 
responses,  like delaying  the  Social Security  offset  to correspond  to a later 9  Overview 
Social Security retirement age, may simply be a logical revision of current firm 
plan  provisions.  The  authors  conclude  that,  in  considering  the  effect  of 
changes in Social Security rules,  like the retirement age, it is important to 
understand the implications of private pension plan provisions. In particular, 
to predict the effect on retirement decisions of changes in Social Security rules 
accurately, the potential response of firms to the changes cannot be ignored. 
Although their analysis is based on the retirement experience in a single 
large firm, Stock and Wise emphasize that the firm’s pension plan is typical 
of defined benefit plans. Approximately 75 percent of the employees who are 
covered by a firm pension have defined benefit plans. Thus, the results suggest 
that pension plans in general have had a very substantial effect on the labor 
force participation rates of older workers. 
Although the retirement behavior of men has been studied extensively, much 
less attention has been given to the retirement behavior of women and very 
little  to the  retirement  behavior  of  couples.  Studies  of  the  labor  supply 
decisions of couples typically find that the wife’s labor supply is influenced by 
the husband’s wage rate or by the husband’s income. In “The Joint Retirement 
Decision of  Husbands  and Wives,”  Michael Hurd investigates the relation 
between the retirement decisions of husbands and wives. 
Hurd’s analysis, based on the New Beneficiary Survey, has two goals: (1) 
to study the correlation between the retirement dates of husbands and wives 
and (2) to determine whether observable economic variables contribute to any 
correlation in retirement dates. Hurd concludes that husbands and wives do 
indeed tend to retire at approximately the same time. For example, in a “male 
workers”  sample,  6.1 percent  of  couples retired  in  the  same month,  9.4 
percent within one month of each other, 11  percent within two months of each 
other, and 24.6 percent in the same year. 
A  large  fraction  of  the  economic  research  on  aging  and  retirement  is 
motivated  by-although  possibly  not  constrained by-the  assumption  that 
individuals form rational  and deliberate long-range plans. Implicit  in these 
assumptions  is the notion  that  individuals  develop well-informed  opinions 
about the economic factors that will affect their well-being in the future. But, 
in fact, very little is actually known about the manner in which individuals 
incorporate new information in arriving at expectations about future events. In 
“How Do the Elderly Form Expectations? An Analysis of Responses to New 
Information,”  Douglas  Bernheim  examines  the  evolution  of  self-reported 
expectations about Social Security benefits during the preretirement period and 
examines the effect of new information on these expectations. In particular, 
Bemheim  considers whether  changes,  or  “revisions,”  in  expectations are 
“rational,”  in  the  sense  that  they  closely  resemble  the  effects  of  new 
information on actual measures of expected benefits. 
This paper is the third in a series of papers by Bernheim on the accuracy and 
development of expectations. In a subsequent paper,  he plans to study the 
relation between the self-reported expectations of individuals and the decisions 10  David A. Wise 
of these individuals. Like the previous two papers, the analysis in this paper 
is based on data from the Retirement History Survey. Bernheim estimates how 
expectations  change  with  new  information  and  considers  whether  these 
changes  in  expectations  are rational.  He concludes  that  responses  to  new 
information during the period immediately preceding retirement appear to be 
highly  rational.  According  to  Bernheim,  the  data  support  the  view  that 
individuals form accurate assessments of the ultimate effect of new informa- 
tion on actual benefits. 
Bernheim points out that these results contrast sharply with findings based 
on  analyses  of  expected  benefit  levels,  rather  than  changes  in  expected 
benefits.  In prior work, Bernheim concluded that individuals did not  make 
complete  use  of  available  information,  especially  current  statutory  Social 
Security benefit entitlements.  Nevertheless,  Bernheim finds that these same 
individuals are very good at using new information that they obtain just before 
retirement. Although people appear incompletely informed about the level of 
Social Security benefits associated with actual benefit formulas, they revise 
their benefit expectations as if they understand  how new information affects 
the benefits prescribed by these formulas at the margin. The results suggest that 
individuals  formulate  expectations  about the retirement  period  much  more 
carefully as retirement approaches, substantiating the speculative conclusions 
made by Bernheim in earlier studies. 
Firms  are likely  to  adapt  their  behavior  in  response  to the  aging of  the 
population. In “Adjusting  to an Aging Labor Force,”  Edward Lazear specu- 
lates about how the demographic changes will affect labor force policies in the 
coming decades. Lazear begins his analysis by considering some of the labor 
force changes that might be expected.  According to Lazear, the composition 
of the labor force is likely to include a larger proportion of older workers and 
a larger proportion of  female workers. Aging will not be as pronounced for 
males as for females because the trend toward early retirement among males 
will offset the demographic changes. The size of the labor force will grow until 
about 2015 and then will decline. Given these predicted changes in the labor 
force, Lazear then explores how these changes might affect firm behavior. 
Several of  Lazear’s  conclusions  are based  on the  assumption  that  older 
workers tend to be paid more than their marginal product.  Since employing 
older workers then causes a firm deficit (defined as the difference between sales 
and labor costs), an aging labor force may mean an increase in the size of the 
firm deficit. Under these circumstances, Lazear argues, firms may do well to 
invest in assets that are highly correlated with the future uncertain  nominal 
wage bill liability. An aging work force might also increase the desire of the 
firm to encourage retirement among its older workers.  Lazear suggests that 
implicit buyouts, through strategically designed pension formulas, may be the 
most desirable way to reduce the size of the older work force. Because defined 
benefit pension plans offer implicit buyout features that are absent in defined 
contribution plans, firms may have a tendency to shift to defined benefit plans 11  Overview 
in the future. Lazear also speculates that an aging labor force is likely to affect 
firm productivity, but he acknowledges that the direction of the change is not 
clear. 
John Rust’s paper “Behavior of Male Workers at the End of the Life Cycle: 
An Empirical Analysis of States and Controls” is the second of  a series of three 
papers  on  the  retirement  behavior  of  men.  The  first  paper,  “A  Dynamic 
Programming Model of  Retirement Behavior,”  presented a theoretical model 
based on the hypothesis that workers maximize expected discounted lifetime 
utility.  The current  paper  explains how  data from the  Retirement  History 
Survey were used to construct  variables that will be used to implement  the 
theoretical model. The third paper will use the constructed variables together 
with the theoretical model described in the first paper to estimate the unknown 
parameters and utility function that govern retirement  behavior. 
The success of the final stage depends critically on accurate measurement 
of  the  variables  and  on correct specification  of  workers’  beliefs  about  the 
future. In the current paper, Rust discusses conceptual problems in measuring 
the variables in a way that closely approximates the theoretical underpinnings 
of his dynamic model. He presents solutions to the measurement problems and 
conducts an extensive comparative data analysis to assess the overall quality 
of the resulting variables. 
This paper reports several interim  findings.  Although  other authors have 
placed  considerable  emphasis  on  work  after  retirement,  Rust  finds  that 
postretirement work is atypical. The typical male worker stays at a full-time 
job up until retirement (at age 62-65,  e.g.), at which time he applies for Social 
Security and remains out of the labor force for the rest of  his life. Rust finds 
that part-time work arrangements are also atypical. The distribution of total 
annual hours worked is highly bimodal, with most of its mass at either zero 
or two thousand, suggesting that workers do not treat annual hours of work as 
a continuous decision variable. 
Rust finds that the distribution of real wealth changes is centered about zero, 
but with a large variance. On average, net worth is very small, about four times 
annual income, and 50-60  percent of this wealth is tied up in housing. These 
facts, he concludes, strongly support the view that the large swings in measured 
consumption implied by the changes in measured wealth are simply the result 
of response errors in measured wealth rather than erratic consumption-saving 
behavior. Thus, he concludes that implementation of his theoretical model will 
assume that workers choose labor force participation strategies to maximize the 
expected discounted value of future income, ignoring wealth and bequests and 
the theoretical possibility of smoothing consumption by borrowing and saving. 
Total income will be a good measure of actual annual consumption. This Page Intentionally Left Blank